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This paper provides a general overview of the allocation of revenues and expenditures across 
levels of governments in Canada and discusses how public services in specific areas are financed 
and delivered. In doing so, the paper draws attention to a number of important characteristics of 
the Canadian federation and of its evolution in the post-war period as well as in recent years. In 
particular, the discussion highlights the relatively high and increasing degree of decentralization 
of the Canadian federation, reflected through the rising importance of provincial revenues and 
expenditures in the last five decades and the recent devolution of some provincial 
responsibilities to local governments, among other things. The discussion also illustrates the 
significant overlap of taxation powers and expenditure responsibilities across the three levels of 
government. 
 
The paper is divided into five sections. The first section briefly describes the constitutional 
allocation of responsibilities of each level of government. The second section looks at some of 
the trends in the revenues and expenditures by levels of government, as well as 
intergovernmental transfers in the post-war period. In the third section, the sources of revenues 
are examined. The fourth section describes the allocation of expenditures in each area and 
discusses how some of the main public services are financed and delivered. The last section 
further examines the role of municipal governments by briefly discussing the budgetary process 
at the municipal level and by providing a succinct overview of the recent devolution of 
provincial responsibilities to municipalities in Ontario. 
 
I.  Constitutional  Provisions 
 
Canada is composed of ten provinces and three territories and is governed by three orders of 
government: the federal, provincial and local governments. The division of powers between the 
federal and provincial governments was initially specified in the Constitution     52    J. Tremblay / Public Policy Review   
Act of 1867, which was amended a few times, most notably in 1982. Territorial governments have 
no constitutional standing. Their expenditure responsibilities and ability to raise revenues are 
delegated to them by the federal government, which generally plays a more important role in the 
provision of services in the territories than in the provinces. 
 
The powers of the federal government are set out in article 91 of the constitution. They include, 
in particular: the public debt and property, the regulation of trade and commerce, defense, 
military and naval services, criminal law, unemployment insurance, money and banking, patents 
and copyrights, postal services, census and statistics, and the raising of money by any mode or 
system of taxation. 
 
Article 92 lists the areas of provincial jurisdiction, which includes: property and civil rights, 
hospitals, management and sale of public lands, the administration of justice, municipal 
institutions, all matters of a local nature, and direct taxation within the province. Article 92A 
provides provinces with the exclusive jurisdiction over non-renewable natural resources, 
forestry and electrical energy. Article 93 establishes provincial jurisdiction over education, 
while articles 94A and 95 provide joint federal-provincial jurisdictions in the areas of public 
pensions, agriculture and immigration. 
 
The constitution does not provide any power to local governments, which are under the full 
responsibility of provincial governments. Hence, some expenditure responsibilities and taxation 
powers are delegated to local governments at the discretion of provinces. Therefore, local 
governments are highly dependent of provincial governments, from which they receive their 
mandate and an important part of their revenues, as we will see later. Recently however, 
legislation has been passed in a number of provinces, including Alberta, Ontario and British 
Columbia, intended to provide more flexibility and autonomy to municipal governments, 
although it is not clear that these objectives were attained (McAllister, 2004). Local 
governments can include municipal governments, school boards, and various sorts of agencies. 
Together, they are generally responsible for a range of functions including protection services, 
transportation systems, education, health and welfare in some provinces, water and sewers, 
garbage collection, etc. However, the extent of expenditure delegation to local governments and 
the structure of local governments vary significantly across provinces.   
 
Despite the constitutional allocation of responsibilities, the federal government may spend in 
areas of exclusive provincial jurisdiction by making use of its so-called spending power. 
Although the spending power is not explicitly specified by the constitution, several articles of 
the constitution have been invoked to justify it, and in practice, the importance of the federal 
spending power is far from negligible as several of the federal government’s expenditures and   Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance, Japan, Public Policy Review, Vol.3, No.1, December 2007 53 
conditional transfers to provinces are effectively legitimized by the spending power.
1 
 
II.  An overview of revenues, expenditures and transfers by levels of 
government 
 
There has been an important long-run trend towards the decentralization of both 
revenues-raising and program spending in Canada, especially across the federal and provincial 
levels. Figure 1 shows the evolution of own-source revenues (revenues excluding transfers from 
other levels of government) as a share of GDP by level of government between 1945 and 2004. 
The data corresponding to all figures presented below are contained in the Appendix. While 
federal own-source revenues have fluctuated between 15 percent and 20 percent of GDP 
throughout the period, provincial government own-source revenues increased steadily from 
approximately 5 percent of GDP after WWII to 17 percent of GDP in 2004, just above federal 
own-source revenues. In contrast, local government own-source revenues have remained 
remarkably stable over the period at approximately 5 percent of GDP. 
 






































Federal own-source revenues Provincial own-source revenues Local own-source revenues
 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from Statistics Canada, CANSIM, tables 380-0007, 380-0022, 
384-0001, 384-0004, 384-0011, 384-0014, 384-0023 
                                                                            
1  For a more detailed discussion of the federal spending power, see Boadway and Hobson (1993) and 
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A similar pattern also characterizes the expenditures of each level of government for their own 
purposes (total expenditures excluding transfers to other levels of government) as a share of 
GDP, represented for the same period in Figure 2. At the federal level, expenditures dropped 
immediately after the second war and then fluctuated between approximately 11 percent and 16 
percent of GDP up to the mid-1960s. From that point on, federal expenditures were on an 
upward trend until they peaked at 19 percent in 1990, and then decreased rapidly and steadily 
for thirteen consecutive years. They stood at just above 12 percent of GDP in 2004. Both 
provincial and local expenditures as a share of GDP have been on an upward trend between 1945 
and the early 1990s, although the rate of growth has been substantially higher at the provincial 
level after the late 1960s. By the early 1990s, provincial expenditures surpassed federal 
expenditures, although they have also been on a downward trend in the 1990s. Given the 
substantial growth of provincial expenditures, especially in the area of health care, the gap 
between provincial and federal expenditures in expected to become larger. 
 







































Fedral expenditures for own-purposes Provincial expenditures for own purposes Local expenditures for own purposes
 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from Statistics Canada, CANSIM, tables 380-0007, 380-0022, 
384-0001, 384-0004, 384-0011, 384-0014, 384-0023 
 
Intergovernmental transfers are fairly substantial in Canada, both between the federal and 
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categories of federal transfers to provinces: equalization grants and transfers for the financing of 
provincial expenditures in the areas of health care, post-secondary education and social 
assistance. The principle of equalization is specified in the Constitution and requires that the 
federal government transfers funds to provinces to insure that all provincial governments have 
the capacity to offer comparable levels of services to their citizens at comparable levels of 
taxation. Equalization transfers are provided to all provinces with a below-average fiscal 
capacity, which currently includes all provinces except Ontario and Alberta. Broadly speaking, 
the equalization payment to a particular recipient province is determined by a formula, which 
intends to cover, for each eligible tax base, the difference between the revenues that would be 
raised by that province if it were to set the average tax rate on that base and the average 
revenues raised on that tax base across five representative provinces.
2  The second main category 
of transfers are those that are specifically intended for the financing of health care, 
post-secondary education, social assistance and social services, and are now provided to 
provinces on a per capita basis. These transfers are divided in two blocks: the Canada Health 
Transfer (CHT) and the Canada Social Transfer (CST). 
3  
 
Provincial governments also transfer substantial amounts to local governments. In fact, these 
transfers are almost as large as federal transfers to provinces. However, only about 20 percent of 
provincial transfers to local governments are general purpose transfers, in contrast to over 30 
percent for federal transfers to provinces (Treff and Perry, 2005). Most provincial transfers are 
conditional on municipality expenditures on social services, on the construction and 
maintenance of the road systems, public transportation, water treatment and supply and public 
housing. Some of the provincial transfers to local governments have an equalization component, 
although the precise form of these transfers varies across provinces (Boadway and Hobson, 1993; 
Kitchen, 2002). As federal equalization transfers to provinces, they are intended to compensate, 
to some extent, municipalities that have below average tax capacity. In some provinces, 
expenditure needs are also taken into account (Kitchen, 2002; Slack and Bird, 2006), and grants 
may be differentiated for rural and urban municipalities (Slack and Bird, 2006). 
 
Figure 3 presents transfers to provincial governments and to local governments as shares of their 
revenues and expenditures between 1945 and 2004. Transfers to local governments as shares of 
their revenues and expenditures increased steadily between 1945 and the end of the 1970s, from 
around 16-17 percent to over 45 percent. There has been a slow and gradual decline starting in 
the 1980s towards a level of about 40 percent in 2004. The evolution has been quite different at 
the provincial level. Transfers to provinces as shares of revenues and expenditures increased 
                                                                            
2  The five representative provinces are Québec, Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan and British Columbia. 
3  These recently replaced the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST), which had been in place since 
1996, and itself replaced the transfers under the Established Programs Financing and Canada Assistance 
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fairly rapidly between the late-1940s and the early-1960s, peaking at almost 35 percent of 
expenditures in 1959, but then declined almost continuously until 2004, when transfers 
represented only about 16 percent of revenues and expenditures. Hence, local governments rely 
much more heavily on transfers than provincial governments, whose revenues are now highly 
independent of transfers. 
 









































Transfers to provinces as a % of provincial revenues Transfers to provinces as a % of provincial expenditures
Transfers to Local as a % of local revenues Transfers to local as a % of local expenditures
 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from Statistics Canada, CANSIM, tables 380-0007, 380-0022, 
384-0001, 384-0004, 384-0011, 384-0014, 384-0023 
 
Budgetary surpluses of each level of government are represented in Figure 4 for the period 
1945-2004. At the end the WWII in 1945, the federal deficit was equal to 15 percent of GDP, but 
was rapidly eliminated with the decrease of military expenditures. Important surpluses were 
then accumulated for the next ten years or so. The budgetary balance of the federal government 
then fluctuated in a fairly narrow band around zero until the mid-1970s, when a long period of 
large deficit started. The federal deficit reached almost 8 percent of GDP in 1985. The federal 
budgetary balance improved progressively after that, became positive in 1996 and remained 
positive until 2004, although under 2 percent of GDP.   
 
At the provincial level, the budgetary balance was more stable and fluctuated around zero until 
the early-1980s. Similarly to the federal government, provincial governments then fell into   Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance, Japan, Public Policy Review, Vol.3, No.1, December 2007 57 
deficits for much of the 1980s and 1990s, although the consolidated deficits of provincial 
governments were much smaller than federal deficits. They peaked at 4 percent of GDP in 1992. 
Although the situation improved progressively after 1992, the budget balance of provincial 
governments has remained negative in all years since then, except for 1999 and 2000, and has 
been significantly below the federal budget balance in all years between 1997 and 2004. 
 







































Federal  Provincial Local
 
Source:  Author’s calculations using data from Statistics Canada, CANSIM, tables 380-0007, 384-0001 and 
384-0014. Due to a break in the series following the introduction of full accrual accounting, data 
for the federal government starting in 1983-84 are not directly comparable with earlier years 
 
The budget balance of local governments is highly stable through time and close to zero, 
reflecting the fact that, in all provinces, provincial governments impose important restrictions 
on the local government budgetary process (Kitchen, 2002; Emery, 2003; Bird and Tassonyi, 
2002), including constraints on the ability of local governments to run deficits and incur debt 
(Kitchen 2002; Slack and Bird, 2006). Usually, local governments can only borrow to finance 
capital investments. More discussion of the restrictions imposed on the local budgetary process 
is provided in Section 5.1 below. 
 
The net debt as a share of GDP for the federal government and provincial governments combined 
is depicted in Figure 5 for the period after 1961 and 1983, respectively. Of course, the long period 58    J. Tremblay / Public Policy Review   
of deficits in the 1980s and 1990s lead to a rapid growth of the debt-to-GDP ratio, which peaked 
for the federal government at 74 percent in 1995 and at 29 percent in 1999 for provincial 
governments. However, the rapid growth of GDP since the second half of the 1990s and the 
improved budget balances lead to a rapid reduction in debt-to-GDP ratio, which fell to 43 
percent and 22 percent in 2004 at the federal and provincial levels, respectively. 
































Federal government All provincial and territorial governments
 
Source:  Author’s calculations using data from Statistics Canada, CANSIM, tables 380-0007, 384-0001 and 
384-0014. 
 
Finally, Figure 6 depicts provincial net debts as a share of GDP by province for the period 
1983-2004. There are wide variations across provinces with Alberta having a negative debt of -8 
percent of GDP in 2004 compared a debt-to-GDP ratio of over 60 percent in Newfoundland. 
Ontario and Quebec were in the middle of the pack in 2004 with debt-to-GDP ratios of 27.5 
percent and 32 percent, respectively. 
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Source:  Author’s calculations using data from Statistics Canada, CANSIM, tables 380-0007, 384-0001 and 
384-0014. Due to a break in the series following accounting changes, data after the following 
years are not directly comparable with earlier years: Newfoundland (1993-94), Québec (1997-98), 
Ontario (1999-2000) and BC (2000-01). 
 
 
III.    Sources of revenues by levels of government 
 
The relative importance of each source of revenues varies considerably across levels of 
governments. The shares of revenues by sources are presented in Table 1 for the federal, 
provincial and local governments as well as school boards. Several points are noteworthy. First, 
the income tax field is occupied only by the federal and provincial governments, and represents 
over 60 percent of federal revenues and around 30 percent of provincial revenues. Second, 
consumption taxes are also used almost exclusively by the federal and provincial governments 
and correspond to around 20 percent of revenues at both levels. Third, property taxes are the 
main component of own-source revenues of local governments and school boards. They account 
for about two-thirds of local own-source revenues and over 80 percent of school boards 
own-source revenues. It is important to note, however, that own-source revenues represent only 
about 60 percent of local total revenues and less than 30 percent of school boards revenues. 
Finally, contributions to social security plans account for about 10 percent of federal revenues, 
while the sales of goods and services generates 15 percent of local revenues.   60    J. Tremblay / Public Policy Review   
 
TABLE 1: Sources of Revenues by Level of Government (%) 
 
 Federal  Provincial  Local  School  Boards 
  2001  2005  2001 2005 2001 2004 2001  2004 
          
Own source revenue  99.7  99.7  85.2 81.4 60.5 60.4 28.0  27.8 
Income taxes  6 2 . 0   6 1 . 2   3 1 . 4 2 9 . 4     
Consumption taxes  19.7  21.7  22.3 23.1 0.1  0.1     
Property and related 
taxes 
    4.0  3.9  40.2 40.4 23.0  22.8 
Other taxes  0.3  0.3  6.4  6.6  0.7  0.7     
Health and drug 
insurance premiums 
   1 . 0   1 . 3       
Contributions to 
social security plans 
1 1 . 4   9 . 7   2 . 8   3 . 1       
Sales of goods and 
services 
2.3  3.1  4.3  2.6  15.5 15.5 4.7  4.7 
Investment income  3.6  3.0  12.8 11.2 3.1  2.7  0.2  0.2 
Other revenue from 
own sources 
0.4  0.5  0.2  0.2  0.9  0.9  0.1  0.1 
Total transfers  0.3  0.3  14.8 18.6 39.5 39.6 72.0  72.2 
General purpose 
transfers 
0.3  0.3  12.2 10.6 1.6  1.7     
Specific purpose 
transfers 
0.0  0.0  2.7  8.0  37.9 37.9    
Source: Author's calculations using data from Statistics Canada, CANSIM, tables 385-0001, 385-0002, 
385-0003, 385-0009. 
 
At both the provincial and local levels, there is considerable variation in the sources of 
government revenues across provinces. Tables 2 and 3 present the shares of revenues from each 
source across provinces, for provincial and local governments, respectively. At the provincial 
level, the following points are of interest. First, the proportion of own-source revenues differs 
significantly across provincial governments. It ranges from 57 percent in Newfoundland to 89 
percent in Alberta, the richest province. Second, Ontario and Québec rely much more heavily on 
income taxation than the other provinces, while the relative importance of consumption taxes is 
more uniform across provinces, if were exclude Alberta where the proportion of revenues from 
consumption taxes is much less important.   Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance, Japan, Public Policy Review, Vol.3, No.1, December 2007 61 
 
TABLE 2: Sources of Provincial Government Revenues by Province, 2005, (%) 
 
 NFLD  PEI  NS NB  QUE  ONT  MAN  SASK ALB  BC 
            
Own source revenue  57.3 61.1 67.2  63.2 83.4 84.7 69.3 78.3  89.3  83.3 
Income taxes  18.4 18.1 25.7  18.9 33.0 36.4 24.2 18.9  23.7  21.3 
Consumption taxes  23.2 25.3 25.5  20.9 22.2 28.7 21.9 22.1  10.7  24.5 
Property and related 
taxes 
0.2 5.1 1.2  6.2 3.1 3.2 3.9 4.1  4.2  7.6 
Other taxes  4.7 2.6 2.4  2.1 10.4 7.8 5.3 6.1  3.6  2.1 
Health/drug 
insurance premiums 
    0.2    1.2       3.1  4.7 
Social security 
contributions 
3.5 2.3 2.5  2.1 3.3 3.5 1.6 1.9  3.1  3.4 
Sales of goods and 
services 
3.1 4.7 4.5  2.6 3.1 2.3 1.9 4.3  1.6  2.5 
Investment income  4.2 3.1 5.3  10.2 6.7 2.7 10.4 20.6  39.2  16.9 
Other revenue from 
own sources 
0.2 0.1 0.1  0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3  0.1  0.3 
General purpose 
transfers 
32.3 35.7 24.2  32.8 11.2 5.6 20.9 10.1  4.3  8.3 
Specific purpose 
transfers 
10.4 3.2 8.6  4.0 5.4 9.7 9.8 11.5  6.4  8.4 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from Statistics Canada, CANSIM, table 385-0002. 
Provinces are ordered from East to West and are: Newfoundland (NFLD), Prince 
Edward Island (PEI), Nova Scotia (NS), New-Brunswick (NB), Quebec (QUE), Ontario 
(ONT), Manitoba (MAN), Saskatchewan (SASK), Alberta (ALB) and British Columbia 
(BC). 
 
There is even more variation in the sources of revenues at the local level. In particular, the share 
of own-source revenues in total revenues varies from about 25 percent and 30 percent in 
Prince-Edward Island and Newfoundland to 71 percent and 86 percent in Saskatchewan and 
New-Brunswick. Correspondingly, there are large variations in the relative importance of 
transfers to local governments. The share of transfers in local government revenues ranges from 
4.5 percent in New-Brunswick to 68 and 74 percent in Newfoundland and Prince-Edward Island. 
The share of property taxes in total revenues differs greatly across provinces, although as a share 
of own-source revenues, the variations would not be as important. 
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TABLE 3: Sources of Local Government Revenues by Province, 2004, (%) 
 
 NFLD  PEI  NS NB  QUE  ONT  MAN  SASK ALB  BC 
            
Own source revenue  29.6 24.9 55.1  86.2 58.0 64.5 56.7 71.0  54.8  56.2 
Consumption taxes  0.0   0.1        0.7 2.4    0.1 
Property and related 
taxes 
20.8 18.2 42.7  58.0 41.8 45.7 38.2 51.8  27.4  29.7 
Other taxes  0.4 0.1 0.3  0.6 0.2 0.8 0.5 0.3  1.1  1.6 
Sales of goods and 
services 
7.5 6.0 10.3  26.3 13.9 15.3 12.9 12.6  19.7  18.1 
Investment income  0.6 0.2 1.3  0.8 1.0 2.0 3.6 3.3  5.6  6.3 
Other revenue from 
own sources 
0.3 0.5 0.4  0.4 1.2 0.9 0.7 0.5  1.1  0.4 
General purpose 
transfers 
2.1 0.8 1.8  9.3 1.6 1.7 6.5 2.4  0.3  0.6 
Specific purpose 
transfers 
68.3 74.2 43.1  4.5 40.4 33.7 36.8 26.6  44.9  43.2 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from Statistics Canada, CANSIM, table 385-0003. 
Local government revenues in this table include school boards revenues. 
 
 
IV.    Expenditures: Allocation and Delivery 
 
IV.1.    An Overview of Expenditure Allocation by Functions and Levels of Government 
 
Most expenditure functions tend to be concentrated at one level of government, although the 
three levels are active to some extent in almost all areas. The allocation of expenditures across 
functions is presented in Table 4 for each level of government in 2001 and 2005 (2004 for local 
governments). The area of social services is by far the largest expenditure area for the federal 
government. It represents 36 percent of federal expenditures, and includes, among other things, 
the unemployment insurance program and public pension plans. Protection, health, transfers 
and debt charges each represented approximately 10 percent of federal expenditures in 2005. 
Notice that the share of interest payments on the debt has decreased substantially between 2001 
and 2005, from 17 to about 11 percent of total expenditures. 
 
At the provincial level, health, education and social services together represented almost 70 
percent of expenditures in 2005, with health alone being one third of total expenditures and   Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance, Japan, Public Policy Review, Vol.3, No.1, December 2007 63 
rising over time. Although not as much as at the federal level, debt charges of provincial 
governments have also decreased significantly, from about 14 to 11 percent of expenditures. 
 
The local level of government includes school boards, and as a result, over 40 percent of local 
expenditures are in the area of education. Transportation and communication, protection 
services, and environment each account for about 10 percent of expenditures. Other areas of 
significant spending include recreation and culture (7 percent), social services (6 percent) and 
housing (2 percent). Interest payments on public debt accounted for only 3 percent of local 
government expenditures in 2004, reflecting the relatively low levels of indebtedness of local 
governments. 
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TABLE 4: Allocation of Expenditures by Level of Government 
 
 Federal  Provincial  Local 
  2001 2005 2001 2005 2001 2004 
        
General government services  4.7  3.6  1.7  1.9  5.3  5.1 
Protection of persons and 
property 
10.0  11.4  3.9  4.0  9.4  9.7 
Transportation and 
communication 
1.1  1.1  4.1  4.2  11.1  11.3 
Health  1.9  10.7  30.5  33.6  1.4  1.4 
Social services  36.2  36.4  16.6  15.9  6.3  5.9 
Education  2.7  2.4  19.7  19.9  42.3  41.2 
Resource conservation and 
industrial development 
3.6  3.8  4.3  4.6  1.2  1.1 
Environment  0.8  0.9  0.7  0.8  8.8  10.6 
Recreation and culture  1.8  2.0  1.1  1.1  7.1  7.2 
Labour, employment and 
immigration 
1.3  1.3  0.4  0.4     
Housing  1.0  1.0  1.3  0.8  2.1  2.2 
Foreign affairs and international 
assistance 
2.4  2.4         
Regional planning and 
development 
0.2  0.3  0.5  0.5  1.0  1.1 
Research establishments  1.0  1.3  0.2  0.3     
General purpose transfers  13.8  10.5  0.7  0.7     
Debt charges  17.3  10.8  13.8  10.7  3.7  3.1 
Other expenditures  0.1  0.0  0.7  0.5  0.1  0.1 
Total  100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 
Source: Author's calculations using data from Statistics Canada, CANSIM, tables 385-0001, 
385-0002, 385-0003, 385-0009. 
 
The allocation of provincial government expenditures by function in 2005 is presented in Table 
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British Columbia, at over 37 percent, and lowest in Québec (28 percent). Interestingly, the 
relative importance of education expenditures in provincial budget is highest in Alberta (24.5 
percent) and Newfoundland (23 percent). Interest payments on the debt are highest in Nova 
Scotia and New-Brunswick, where they actually represent a larger share of provincial budgets 
than social services. 
 
TABLE 5: Allocation of Provincial Government Expenditures by Province, 2005, (%) 
 
 NFLD  PEI  NS NB  QUE  ONT  MAN  SASK ALB  BC 
            
General government 
services 
2.0 5.1 0.9  1.7 2.2 1.5 1.9 1.7  1.5  1.8 
Protection of persons 
and property 
4.6 3.2 4.0  3.5 3.6 4.4 4.1 5.0  3.0  4.6 
Transportation and 
communication 
7.1 7.8 3.6  6.2 3.9 3.8 3.4 4.2  5.4  4.1 
Health  30.2 29.7 35.2  31.3 28.2 37.4 33.0 32.4  33.6  37.6 
Social services  12.6 10.0 12.0  11.4 17.6 16.7 15.5 13.5  16.0  13.7 
Education  23.2 19.2 19.4  20.1 19.3 18.7 17.4 15.8  24.5  22.0 
Resource conservation and 
industrial development 
3.3 9.4 3.5  3.8 4.9 2.8 3.9 10.3  8.2  5.0 
Environment  1.6 3.2 0.6  0.9 0.8 0.6 0.6 1.4  0.8  0.7 
Recreation and 
culture 
1.5 1.4 1.0  0.9 1.5 0.7 1.2 1.5  1.4  1.0 
Labour, employment 
and immigration 
0.2 0.4 0.2  0.7 1.0 0.1 0.3 0.2  0.4  0.2 
Housing  1.0 0.5 1.5  1.1 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.7  0.5  0.5 
Regional planning 
and development 
0.5 0.5 0.6  0.6 0.7 0.4 1.4 0.5  0.2  0.4 
Research 
establishments 
    0.0    0.7 0.1 0.0 0.1  0.4  0.0 
General purpose 
transfers 
0.9 0.4 0.8  1.7 1.3 0.1 2.8 1.1  0.3  0.3 
Debt charges  11.3 9.5 16.9  16.1 13.8 10.7 13.7 10.5  2.7  8.2 
Other expenditures        1 . 2    1 . 2    
Source:  Author’s calculations using data from Statistics Canada, CANSIM, table 385-0002. 
 
Table 6 presents the shares of local government expenditures in each area by province in 2004. 66    J. Tremblay / Public Policy Review   
There are large variations across provinces in a number of areas, most notably in protection, 
transportation and communication, and education. Note that there are no school boards in 
New-Brunswick, so that all education expenditures are directly financed by the provincial 
government. 
 
TABLE 6: Allocation of Local Government Expenditures by Province, 2004, (%) 
 
  NFLD  PEI  NS NB  QUE  ONT  MAN  SASK ALB  BC 
            
General government 
services 
6.7 4.2 8.1  7.9 7.5 3.1 8.0 6.4  6.1  5.6 
Protection of persons 
and property 
2.2 6.4 10.7  20.7 9.3 10.0 8.5 8.2  9.0  11.0 
Transportation and 
communication 
8.8 5.9 8.2  23.6 12.2 10.3 12.3 15.9  14.0  9.5 
Health  0.0 0.1 0.1  0.2 0.1 2.7 1.2 0.2  1.0  0.5 
Social services  0.1 0.0 2.0    0.4 12.6 0.2 0.2  1.0  0.1 
Education  x  72.9 45.4  0.0 43.8 37.8 49.7 51.1  44.7  41.4 
Resource conservation and 
industrial development 
0.3 0.4 0.6  2.0 1.4 1.0 1.2 1.2  1.6  0.7 
Environment  9.4 4.5 17.0  27.4 9.1 10.4 8.3 8.4  8.0  15.3 
Recreation and 
culture 
4.9 4.6 5.5  11.6 7.4 6.0 5.4 6.7  8.5  10.7 
Housing  0.2 0.0 0.0  0.3 1.7 3.6 0.2 0.0  0.8  0.4 
Regional planning 
and development 
0.4 0.6 0.8  2.4 1.5 0.7 0.7 0.8  1.6  1.4 
Debt charges  3.3 0.4 1.6  3.8 5.8 1.8 4.1 0.7  3.7  3.2 
Other expenditures  x    0.1  0.1   0.0 0.1 0.0  0.0  0.3 
Source:  Author’s calculations using data from Statistics Canada, CANSIM, table 385-0003, x: 
suppressed to meet the confidentiality requirements of the Statistics Act. Local 
government expenditures in this table include school boards expenditures. 
 
 
IV.2.    Public Service Delivery in Specific Expenditure Areas 
 
A brief overview of how some of the main expenditure functions are allocated across levels of 




Health care services are largely provided by provincial governments, although part of the 
funding comes from the federal government. The first column in Table 7 gives the share of federal 
funding in total provincial health care expenditures for the period 1977-1996, taking federal 
funding for health care to be the transfers under the Established Programs Financing (EPF) 
arrangements that were intended for hospital insurance, medical insurance and extended health 
care. Although the federal transfer under EPF was a block grant for health care, post-secondary 
education and social assistance, notional shares for each expenditure areas were calculated 
based on the relative shares of transfers under the pre-EPF arrangements (prior to 1977). As the 
Table indicates, the contribution of the federal government decreased substantially over the 
period from about 26 percent in 1977 to 12 percent in 1996. The relative contribution of the 
federal government after 1996 is somewhat more difficult to establish precisely given that the 
notional shares calculations were dropped with the introduction of the Canada Health and 
Social Transfer (CHST) in 1997. In order to estimate the federal share of funding during the 
period of CHST transfers, Lazar, St-Hilaire and Tremblay (2004) used three values for the share 
of transfers intended for health care, based on 1) the notional share under EPF arrangements 
(43%), 2) the notional share under EPF arrangements augmented by additional federal transfers 
that were specifically provided for health care (50%), 3) the actual share of provincial health 
care expenditures in total provincial program expenditures (68%). The resulting shares of the 
federal contribution for health care expenditures are shown in the last three columns for the 
period 1997-2003. Hence, estimates range between about 10 and 16 percent, in any case 
substantially lower than in 1977. Partly for the purpose of making the federal contribution more 
transparent, the CHST was dividing in 2004 into the Canada Health Transfer (CHT) and the 
Canada Social Transfer (CST). 
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TABLE 7: Federal Transfers to Provinces Intended for Health Care as a Share of   
Provincial Government Expenditures on Health Care (%) 
 
1977  26.5    % of CHST transfers 
attributed to health care 
1978  26.5    
1979  29.2    
43%  50%  68% 
1980  25.4       
1981  22.8    1997  11.0  12.8  17.4 
1982  18.2    1998  8.1  9.4  12.8 
1983  19.7    1999  7.9  9.2  12.5 
1984  23.4    2000  9.2  10.7  14.6 
1985  24.7    2001  9.2  10.6  14.5 
1986  21.3    2002  9.4  11.0  14.9 
1987  19.8    2003  9.9  11.5  15.7 
1988  19.4       
1989  16.7       
1990  14.6       
1991  12.9       
1992  15.2       
1993  17.8       
1994  15.0       
1995  15.6       
1996  12.2       
Source: Author’s calculation using data from Canadian Institute for 
Health Information (CIHI) and CANSIM, table 385-0002. 
Federal transfers intended for health care are the sum of federal 
transfers for hospital insurance, medical insurance, extended 
health care for the period 1977-1996 and the health portion of 
CHST for the period 1997-2003. 
 
Federal transfers to provinces for the financing of health care are subject to five general criteria 
specified in the Canada Health Act which has been established in 1984. The main objective of 
the Act is to insure that provincial health care systems meet certain national standards and that 
all Canadians have access to necessary health care services independently of their incomes. The 
five criteria are the following: 
Comprehensive scope: All medical services that are deemed necessary must be covered by provincial 
health plans 
Universal coverage:  T h e  s a m e  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  c o v e r a g e  m u s t  b e  p r o v i d e d  t o  a l l  r e s i d e n t s  o f  a  
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Public Administration: Provincial health plans must be publicly administered and operated. 
Portability: Coverage must be provided to individuals that are away from the province on a 
temporary basis or that have moved to another province and are not yet covered by the health 
plan of that province. 
Accessibility: The accessibility of individuals to health care services cannot be limited by various 
barriers, including financial constraints.   
 
To enforce these criteria, there may be deductions from federal transfers to provinces that do not 
comply. In practice, deductions are small. Nonetheless, federal influence on the design of 
provincial health care systems is not negligible as these deductions can potentially be important. 
For example, one dollar is deducted from federal transfers for every dollar of user fees or extra 
billing imposed on patients. 
 
Provincial government expenditures on health care are largely financed out of general tax 
revenues. Some provinces raise revenues from health and drug insurance premiums, but the 
contribution of these revenues to health financing is quite small. In 2004, total health and drug 




Most hospitals are owned by provincial governments, although there are some private hospitals. 
For example, in Ontario, there are currently eight private hospitals out of a total of over 200 
hospitals. Moreover, there has been some recent interest in some provinces to build and manage 
new hospitals through public-private partnerships. Most individuals working in hospitals, 
including nurses, are public employees. The majority of doctors, however, are self-employed and 
bill the government for the services they provide. 
 
Services covered by the Canada Health Act and provided by the provinces include all physician 
and hospital services that are medically required. Outpatient services and drugs are included 
when provided in a hospital. As for other health care services, long-term care and home care 
services are of provincial responsibility, although they are not covered by the Canada Health Act 
and the level of public provision of these services varies substantially across provinces. However, 
the federal government announced, in 2004, a ten-year plan for additional transfers to provinces, 
as part of the Canada Health Transfer, partly intended to finance the expansion of provincial 
long-term care services (Treff and Perry, 2005).   
 
For the provision of long-term care, there are typically publicly supported facilities where 
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services are highly subsidized, but where capacity is usually insufficient to meet demand. The 
extra demand is fulfilled by private facilities where services are not subsidized. Several 
provinces, including Ontario, are currently expanding substantially public home care and 
long-term care services provided outside hospitals. In Ontario, there are two types of public 
support of long-term care for seniors. Provincial subsidies are available for housing 
accommodations where minimal to moderate levels of personal care are provided. Long-term 
care homes are also available for seniors that require 24-hour nursing care. These homes are 
either owned privately or by municipalities, although in both cases, residents pay for the cost of 
accommodation while the provincial Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care finances the costs 
of nursing and personal care services. Community Care Access Centres, which are 
provincially-funded local agencies, provide information about the services available and help 
individuals in accessing long-term care services, among other things. Long term care for 
individuals requiring mental health services is also provided by the provincial government 
through psychiatric hospitals, psychiatric units in general hospitals and homes for special care. 
 
Several provinces are also increasing the importance of community health centres as providers of 
services. These health centres, or primary care networks, are usually coordinated through 
regional health authorities. Ontario is currently in the process of establishing 150 new family 
health networks where family doctors are grouped in order to provide a more extensive set of 
health services (Treff and Perry, 2005). These agencies report to the Ministry of Health and 
Long-Term Care. 
 
Finally, provinces also provide various community health services, such as pre-natal and 
post-natal services, health promotional activities, nutritional education, etc. These services are 
usually provided through schools or other local agencies. 
 
Most health care services to aboriginal people living on reserves or in the Territories are 
financed by the federal government through the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Indian 
Affairs and Northern Development. However, the delivery of services in the three territories has 
progressively been transferred to territorial governments. Public health programs of various 
natures are also provided by the federal government on Native reserves.   
 
The federal Ministry of Health is also responsible for public health and safety programs, 
including food inspection, and the regulation and certification of drugs. The federal government 
also created in 2000 the Canadian Institutes of Health Research which are networks of 
researchers conducting research on various dimensions of health and health services. 
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Education 
Education is of provincial jurisdiction and is provided is all provinces but New-Brunswick 
through local school boards. School boards are essentially local governments that are 
responsible for the management of schools at both the elementary and secondary levels. They are 
independent of municipal governments and are accountable to their electorate. In some 
provinces, but not all, school boards have the authority to levy property taxes. However, as 
discussed previously, most of their funding comes from the provincial government. As indicated 
in Table 1, on average across provinces, transfers from provincial governments accounted for 72 
percent of school board revenues in 2004. This figure, however, masks large inter provincial 
variations. Table 8 shows the sources of school boards revenues for each province. Three points 
are worth noting. First, the relative importance of own-source revenues and transfers is highly 
unequal across provinces. Own-source revenues represent less than 1 percent in Newfoundland, 
compared to over 40 percent in Ontario and almost 55 percent in Saskatchewan. Second, 
virtually all transfers to school boards come from provincial governments, except in Nova Scotia 
where a property tax, the rate of which is chosen by the provincial government, is levied by 
municipalities who transfer the revenues to school boards (Treff and Perry, 2005). Third, 
own-source revenues are generally raised through property taxes. 
 
TABLE 8: Sources of School Board Revenues by Province, 2004, (%) 
 
 NFLD  PEI NS  NB  QUE  ONT  MAN  SASK ALB  BC 
            
Own source revenue  0.9 0.5  3.0   23.9 41.2 36.7 54.7  9.4  4.9 
      Property and related taxes          13.2 38.8 33.6 51.0  4.1   
      Sales of goods and services  0.8 0.4  2.7   10.7 2.2 2.9 2.7  4.5  4.1 
   Investment  income      0.1     0.1 0.2 0.9  0.7  0.6 
   Other  revenue  0.1   0.1     0.1     0.1  0.2 
Transfers  99.1 99.5 97.0   76.1 58.8 63.3 45.3  90.6  95.1 
   Federal  government  0.7       0.1 0.3 0.2     0.3 
   Provincial  governments  98.4 99.5 79.0   75.9 58.5 63.1 45.3  90.5  94.8 
   Municipal  governments      18.0   0.1       0.1   
Source:  Author’s calculations using data from Statistics Canada, CANSIM, table 385-0003. There are 
no school boards in New-Brunswick. Schools are administered directly by the provincial 
government. 
 
Although the level of autonomy of school boards varies to some extent across provinces, there is 
generally a fairly high degree of provincial control over school boards. For example, provincial 
governments typically set the curriculum, regulate teacher qualifications, approve textbooks and 
authorize capital investments (Treff and Perry, 2005). There is not, however, any form of federal 72    J. Tremblay / Public Policy Review   
control over school boards, national standards for education, or significant coordination 
between provinces. 
 
The autonomy of school boards has been further reduced, to some extent, in most provinces in 
recent years (Woolstencroft, 1997; McAllister, 2004). For example, although part of school 
board funding comes from local property taxes, there has been a general tendency to further 
centralize school funding at the provincial level (Boadway and Hobson, 1993; McAllister, 2004). 
In addition, in order to restrain education expenditures, several provinces, including Ontario, 
Quebec and British Columbia have merged local school boards and dramatically increased the 
number of schools under their control. 
 
In addition to providing transfers to provinces intended for the financing of education through 
the Canada Social Transfer, the federal government is also involved in the area of education 
through student assistance programs, which include various loans and grants programs. The 
federal government is also responsible for the education of Natives on reserves. 
 
Income security programs 
The main income security programs are the unemployment insurance program, the Canada 
Pension Plan, the old age security program, child benefit programs and social assistance 
programs.  
 
Unemployment insurance: The unemployment insurance program is under federal responsibility and 
is administered by Human Resources and Skills Development Canada (HRSDC), although 
insurance premiums are collected by the Canada Revenue Agency. Benefits paid under the 
program include regular benefits paid to individuals who lost their jobs, fishing benefits to 
self-employed individuals in the fishing industry who are not working during the off-season, 
compassionate care benefits to individuals who are forced to leave their job temporarily to 
provide care to a sick family member, and maternity, parental and sickness benefits.   
 
Although HRSDC administers the program, individuals can receive information about the 
program or apply for benefits at one of Service Canada offices located throughout the country. 
Service Canada is a federal agency that delivers a range of federal services at the local level, 
including financial benefit to individuals under the unemployment insurance program, the 
Canada Pension Plan, old age security and the child benefits programs, as well as labour market 
services to individuals and businesses (e.g. career planning, placement services, job search 
services, labour market information for employers, etc.), among other things. There are currently 
320 Service Canada offices dispersed in the ten provinces. Service Canada will, over time, 
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Canada Pension Plan (CPP): The CPP is a federal public pension plan administered by Social 
Development Canada that provides retirement benefits, disability benefits and survivor benefits 
to individuals that contributed throughout their life or their surviving spouse. The level of 
individual benefits is a function of the total contributions of individuals during their active 
period in the labour market. The plan is entirely financed from the contributions of employees, 
employers and self-employed and from the funds’ investment income. The program is available 
to all Canadians, although Quebec has its own program that replaces the CPP. Prior to 1998, the 
CPP was a pay-as-you-go system. However, in order to make the plan sustainable in light of the 
demographic changes facing Canada, it has since moved towards a partly funded system and the 
contribution rate was progressively increased from 6 percent to 9.9 percent of pensionable 
earnings between 1997 and 2003. The CPP will be approximately 20 percent funded by 2017
5. 
The fund is managed by a crown corporation, the CPP Investment Board. 
 
Old age security: Old age security is also a federal pension program administered by Social 
Development Canada. However, in contrast to the CPP, the benefits are funded out of general 
government revenues. There are several types of benefits, including regular pension benefits 
available for all Canadians over the age of 65, the Guaranteed Income Supplement provided to 
individuals who receive regular old age security benefits and who have little other income, and 
the Allowance provided to individuals between the ages of 60 and 64 who are in difficult 
circumstances, because of the death of their spouse, for instance. 
 
Child benefits programs: The federal government provides benefits to low- and middle-income 
families who have children under the age of 18 through the Canada Child Tax Benefit program. 
The program is administered by the Canada Revenue Agency. The payments under several 
related provincial child benefit programs are combined with the Canada Child Tax Benefit 
payment but are funded by provincial governments. In addition, low-income families may 
receive the National Child Benefit Supplement which is also funded by the federal government. 
 
Social assistance: Social assistance is under provincial responsibility, although part of the funding 
comes from the federal government as part of the Canada Social Transfer. This transfer payment 
is essentially unconditional and does not require any level of uniformity in the design of 
provincial social assistance programs, which do vary substantially across provinces. In most 
provinces, some responsibilities are shifted to local governments, although the largest share of 
funding is provided by the provincial governments. In Ontario for example, municipalities 
finance around 20 percent of social assistance programs (Treff and Perry, 2005). Although the 
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eligibility requirements and the amounts of income assistance vary across provinces, they are 
both determined by needs tests that take into account income, fixed and liquid assets, medical 
condition, household composition, specific individual needs, etc. In recent years, several 
provinces have introduced various features in their social assistance programs in order to 
increase the incentives of recipients to find work, including time limits that restrict the number 
of months of eligibility within a certain number of years, and transitional benefits or work 
premiums for recipients that find a job (Treff and Perry, 2005).   
 
The Ontario social assistance program has two main components intended, respectively, for 
individuals with disabilities and individuals that are able to work. The amounts of income 
assistance are substantially higher for disable individuals, as in most provinces. Welfare 
recipients that are able to work are required to search for a job, engage in a training program or 
participate in community services. Programs to help welfare recipients find and keep jobs are 
also available for both able and disable individuals. Social assistance programs are administered 




The three levels of government are heavily involved in protection services. Policing services are 
provided by a federal police force, provincial police forces in Quebec and Ontario, municipal 
police forces, as well as some First Nations police bodies operating on Natives reserves. The 
relatively large cities usually have their own police service, responsible for law enforcement 
within the city limits. In smaller municipalities, policing services are provided by either the 
provincial police (in Quebec and Ontario) or by the federal police, although some, or all, of the 
cost is usually supported by the municipal government. 
 
Correctional facilities are administered and operated by both the federal and provincial 
governments. The federal government is responsible for inmates that received sentences of at 
least two years, while the others are under provincial responsibility. 
 
Of course, the federal government has responsibility over national defence and security, border 
protection and control, intelligence services, as well as search and rescue services, although the 
costs of these are shared with provincial and local governments. 
 
Transportation 
The construction and maintenance of the road system is a provincial jurisdiction, although the 
federal government is responsible for roads in national parks. In practice, provinces usually 
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municipalities as well of for the administration and management of local transit systems, while 
highways outside municipalities are kept under provincial government responsibility (Treff and 
Perry, 2005). Provincial governments are also responsible for issuing driver permits and vehicle 
licenses. A substantial share of local governments’ spending on the construction and 
maintenance of the road system is financed from provincial grants. Some federal grants are also 
provided to provincial and local governments for major investments in the road system, usually 
on a matching basis. The federal government is responsible for major airports, for the regulation 
of air transportation and has jurisdiction over water and rail transportation.   
 
Public Housing 
Total expenditures on public housing were generally shared about equally between the federal, 
provincial and local governments until the end of the 1990s. However, federal support in this 
area has decreased somewhat during the 1990s (Treff and Perry, 2001) and a substantial share of 
provincial expenditures was recently shifted to municipal governments, as will be seen below. 
The federal contribution is usually provided through matching grants or on a shared-cost basis 
with provincial governments. Social housing programs include government-owned housing units 
provided to low-income families at below-market prices, non-profit housing programs, rent 
subsidies and public financing assistance such as mortgage insurance provided by a federal 
Crown corporation, the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation. 
 
Provincial and municipal governments are also involved, to various degrees across provinces, in 
providing shelters for homeless people. In Ontario, the provincial government, through the 
Ministry of Community and Social Services, provides most of the public funding for emergency 
hostels, which are managed by the municipalities. It also finances various municipal initiatives 
to prevent homelessness. The regional offices of the provincial Ministry of Community and 
Social Services are responsible for contracting the services with municipalities or directly with 
private non-profit agencies. 
   
Environment 
Local governments supported around 70% of total environment expenditures in 2004-2005 
(Treff and Perry, 2005). Most of local government spending in this area is for water purification 
and supply, sewage collection and disposal, and garbage and waste collection and disposal. 
However, these functions are often regulated and subsidized by provincial governments. Federal 
responsibilities in the environment area include the protection of water and air quality, 
pollution control, meteorological services and international agreements. 
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V.  Local Governments: The Budgetary Process and the Recent Devolution of 
Responsibilities from Provinces to Municipalities 
 
V.1.    The Municipal Budgetary Process 
 
Municipalities are typically headed by a municipal council composed of elected representatives. 
The municipal council holds a range of responsibilities including voting laws and municipal 
regulations, approving budgets and tax policy, and administering the programs and policies of 
the municipality (Tindal and Tindal, 2004). Hence, municipal councils benefit from a fair 
amount of autonomy with respect to provincial governments, although their actions and policies, 
and in particular their budgets and taxation policies, are subject to some constraints imposed by 
provinces. 
 
In particular, as briefly mentioned above, municipalities are not usually allowed to run deficits 
to finance current expenditures. Given their projected expenditures and the transfers 
anticipated from the provincial governments, they must insure that their revenues will be 
sufficient to balance their budget of the coming year. Hence, expenditure variations must be 
matched on a yearly basis by variations in property taxes or user fees, which represent almost all 
of municipal own-source revenues (See Tables 1 and 3 above. Note that user fees account for 
most revenues from the sales of goods and services reported in these Tables).     
 
In practice, municipalities essentially set their property tax rates every year to raise the required 
amount of revenues, given the variations in real property evaluations. These evaluations, usually 
meant to reflect market values, are typically reviewed every few years – the length of 
reassessment cycles vary across provinces, ranging between 1 and 10 years (Kitchen, 2002). In 
several provinces, evaluations are conducted by a province-wide assessment corporation, 
although some larger cities conduct their own property evaluations.   
 
The tax rates on real property are often higher for non-residential properties, even though farms 
and forest lands, among others, are usually taxed at a favorable rate (Boadway and Kitchen, 1999; 
Kitchen, 2002). The special treatment of some types of property is sometimes imposed by 
provincial governments. In some cases, provincial restrictions actually exempt altogether certain 
types of property from taxation. Examples include universities, churches, public hospitals and 
charitable organizations (Kitchen, 2004). 
 
Expenditure variations from year to year can also be financed by adjusting user fees, which 
represent a substantial share of municipal own-source revenues – about 25 percent on average 
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essentially charges imposed on the use of public services, such as water supply, sewage 
collection and disposal, electricity, public transportation, public housing, parking, recreational 
facilities, community centers, etc. 
 
Although municipalities are required to balance their operating budget, they may borrow to 
finance capital investments, sometimes subject to provincial authorization. Provinces impose 
guidelines on the size of debt, but in most municipalities debt levels are not close to those 
specified by these guidelines (Kitchen, 2003). In most provinces, municipal borrowing can be 
done through a provincial authority that essentially borrows the funds on behalf of municipal 
governments. This borrowing procedure is mandatory in some provinces for relatively small 
municipalities. 
 
Most municipalities, or at least the relatively larger ones, have capital budgets, which are 
multi-year plans for the financing of capital investments (Kitchen, 2002). In addition to using 
current operating revenues, reserve funds, grants from the federal and provincial governments or 
borrowing, capital investments are often financed through special charges specifically associated 
with particular projects, such as local improvement charges and development charges (Kitchen, 
2002). Local improvement charges are additional taxes imposed on the property owners that 
will directly benefit from particular investments, such as street paving or the construction of 
sidewalks in a new neighborhood. Local development charges are usually spread over several 
years. Development charges are taxes imposed on developers, usually as a fixed amount per lot, 
to finance the cost of developing services such as water supply. 
 
V.2.  The Recent Devolution of Responsibilities to Municipal Governments: The Case of 
Ontario 
 
A transfer of responsibilities between the provincial and local governments was undertaken in 
Ontario in the second half of the 1990s (Kitchen, 2002). An important component of the reform 
concerned the funding of education (Graham and Phillips, 1998). Before the reform, school 
boards raised approximately half of their revenues from local property taxes. School boards were 
free to set the rate of taxation and the taxes were collected by the municipality on their behalf. 
The other half of their funding came as grants from the provincial government. Following the 
reform, the reliance of school boards on property tax revenues was reduced and replaced by 
higher provincial transfers. Some of the objectives of this change were to increase provincial 
control of the schooling system, increase equity across school boards in levels of funding and 
constrain total education expenditures (Siegel, 2005). In order to finance these increased 
provincial transfers to school boards, transfers to municipalities were reduced and additional 
expenditure responsibilities were shifted to municipal governments, who were allowed to 78    J. Tremblay / Public Policy Review   
occupy the additional property tax room that was created by lower school boards taxes. 
 
The most important transfers of responsibilities were the following.
6 First, a large share of 
provincial housing units and of responsibility for social housing was turned over to 
municipalities. While the federal government remains involved in this area to some extent, 
municipalities are now largely responsible for funding and administering the provincial part of 
social housing. Figure 7 below depicts the share of local government expenditures in particular 
areas as a percentage of total provincial and local governments spending. As the Figure illustrate, 
the share of municipal government expenditures on social housing as a percentage of total 
provincial and local spending in this area decreased from around 30 percent at the beginning of 
the 1990s to just over 10 percent in 1997, but then increased rapidly to reach 70 percent in 2004. 
 













1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Housing Protection of persons and property
Transportation and communication Education
Environment Recreation and culture
Social services Resource conservation and industrial development
 
Source:  Author’s calculations using data from Statistics Canada, CANSIM, tables 385-0002 and 
385-0003. 
 
Second, there were also important transfers of responsibility in the area of transportation. The 
maintenance costs for many roads were shifted from the province to municipalities and 
provincial grants for road construction and municipal transit were largely eliminated. By 2004, 
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the share of local expenditures in total provincial and local spending in the area of 
transportation and communication was around 62 percent, compared to 56 percent in 1989 and 
51 percent in 1996.   
 
Third, while policing services in relatively small municipalities were previously provided by the 
Ontario provincial police force and funded by the province, all municipal governments are now 
responsible for the financing of police services, although smaller municipalities still contract the 
services from the provincial police. The share of local spending on the protection of persons and 
property reached 56 percent in 2004, somewhat above its average level during the 1990s.   
 
Fourth, municipalities are now providing water and sewer services, which were previously 
provided by the province but funded by municipalities. The share of local expenditure in the 
area of environment, which includes water and sewer services, has increased above 90 percent in 
2003 and 2004, compared to around 80 percent at the beginning of the 1990s. Finally, while the 
provincial government used to provide ambulance services, municipalities are now responsible 
for these, although the province still contributes about half of the funding. 
 
It is important to note that the trend towards greater decentralization of responsibilities at the 
municipal level has been significantly more pronounced in Ontario in the past decade than in the 
rest of Canada. For the purpose of comparison, Figure 8 depicts the share of local expenditures 
in specific areas as a percentage of total provincial and local expenditures for all Canadian 
provinces combined. Although there is some evidence of expenditure decentralization in certain 
areas, in particular housing, transportation and communication, and environment, the trend 
does not appear to be as important as in Ontario. 
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Source:  Author’s calculations using data from Statistics Canada, CANSIM, tables 385-0002 and 
385-0003. 
 
The Ontario reform was intended to be financially neutral at both levels of government (Tindal 
and Tindal, 2004). Unconditional provincial grants to municipalities are provided to insure that 
this is the case, although it is difficult to assess whether this neutrality objective has been meet, 
and such grants will likely be eliminated eventually (Siegel, 2005).   
 
As a simple way to assess the overall effects of the reform on the level of decentralization of 
revenues and expenditures, Table 9 presents the shares of local revenues and local expenditures 
in total provincial and local revenues and expenditures between 1981 and 2004. In Ontario, the 
share of local revenues in total provincial and local revenues was around 37 percent in 2004, 
only slightly higher than in 1981. The share of local government own-source revenues has 
increased somewhat during the 1980s, but has been quite stable since 1990. Finally, the share of 
local governments expenditures increased significantly around 1989-1990, but has remained 
fairly constant after. For Canada as a whole, the data actually indicates a certain centralization 
of both revenues and expenditures between local and provincial governments over the same 
period. Hence, there is not much evidence of an important decentralization of overall revenues 
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Canada as a whole. However, the effect of the devolution of certain responsibilities to local 
governments on the overall shares of local and provincial expenditures has been compensated by 
rapid spending increases in certain areas of provincial jurisdiction, in particular health care. 
Moreover, the transfer of provincial responsibilities may have constrained local expenditures in 
certain areas given the additional fiscal pressures on local governments created by these 
changes. 
 
Table 9: Shares of Local Revenues and Local Expenditures in Total Provincial and Local 
Revenues and Expenditures, 1981-2004 (%) 
 
  Ontario Canada 




















1981  35.4  26.5  32.9  31.2  24.1  29.3 
1982  36.2  26.9  32.7  31.5  23.8  28.7 
1983  35.3  26.2  31.7  30.4  22.9  28.1 
1984  34.0  25.5  31.9  29.5  22.7  28.3 
1985  33.7  25.5  31.3  29.3  22.7  27.9 
1986  33.2  24.8  31.3  30.2  23.4  27.5 
1987  32.8  24.6  30.2  29.9  23.4  27.7 
1988  32.3  23.8  30.0  29.2  22.8  27.5 
1989  36.3  29.4  35.7  29.6  23.3  27.6 
1990  36.2  29.0  37.0  30.1  23.5  27.7 
1991  37.5  29.4  37.0  31.4  24.5  27.8 
1992  40.2  31.9  35.5  32.5  25.4  27.7 
1993  39.8  32.8  34.6  31.9  25.1  28.1 
1994  39.6  32.3  35.1  30.9  23.7  28.2 
1995  39.3  31.8  34.9  30.3  23.3  27.9 
1996  36.0  30.3  33.0  29.5  22.6  28.1 
1997  36.4  30.3  34.4  29.6  22.6  28.1 
1998  38.3  29.2  35.8  29.3  22.1  28.1 
1999  37.3  29.2  34.9  28.1  21.7  28.3 
2000  34.8  27.2  35.3  27.1  20.5  27.6 
2001  34.9  27.6  34.5  26.4  20.2  25.6 
2002  36.3  29.0  36.1  27.1  20.6  25.8 
2003  36.7  29.6  35.8  26.2  20.4  25.7 
2004  36.6  30.2  35.6  25.9  19.8  25.8 
Source:  Author’s calculations using data from Statistics Canada, CANSIM, tables 385-0002 and 
385-0003. 82    J. Tremblay / Public Policy Review   
 
In parallel to the reorganization of services, there was also a series of municipal mergers that cut 
the number of municipalities by about half, from around 800 to 400 (Treff and Perry, 2005). The 
mergers were largely initiated, if not imposed, by the provincial government, with the objectives 
of achieving greater efficiency in the delivery of services, and reducing expenditures and taxes 
(Sancton, 2000a; Siegel, 2005), although many observers raised concerns about whether these 
municipal mergers would actually generate efficiency gains (Sancton, 1996; 2000b). Early 
assessments of the mergers generally provide mixed evidence as to whether they were successful 
at increasing efficiency in the provision of services (Kushner and Siegel, 2003a; 2003b).   Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance, Japan, Public Policy Review, Vol.3, No.1, December 2007 83 
APPENDIX: Data corresponding to Figures 1 to 8 
 
TABLE A.1: Own-Source Revenues and Expenditures for Own Purposes, 1945-2004, (% of GDP) 
  Own source revenues  Expenditures for own purposes 
  Federal Provincial  Local  Federal Provincial  Local 
1945  20.2  3.5  3.1  34.2  3.4  3.0 
1946  21.3  4.2  3.2  23.1  3.8  3.2 
1947  19.6  4.7  3.1  13.9  4.0  3.5 
1948  16.7  4.9  3.0  11.0  4.2  3.5 
1949  15.2  4.8  2.9  10.9  4.7  3.7 
1950  15.5  4.7  3.0  10.7  4.5  3.6 
1951  18.4  4.8  2.9  12.8  4.4  3.5 
1952  18.3  4.1  2.9  15.6  3.7  3.5 
1953  17.9  4.1  3.0  15.6  3.7  3.6 
1954  17.1  4.3  3.3  15.3  3.9  4.2 
1955  16.8  4.4  3.2  14.3  3.9  4.2 
1956  17.1  4.4  3.2  13.5  3.9  4.1 
1957  16.2  5.0  3.5  13.6  4.0  4.4 
1958  14.9  5.2  3.7  14.6  4.5  4.8 
1959  15.9  5.5  4.0  13.8  5.1  5.1 
1960  16.2  5.5  4.2  14.0  5.6  5.4 
1961  16.2  6.4  4.9  14.5  6.6  6.5 
1962  15.1  7.5  4.9  14.1  6.5  6.5 
1963  14.8  7.6  4.9  13.4  6.7  6.7 
1964  15.4  8.2  4.8  12.8  6.9  6.7 
1965  15.3  9.0  4.7  12.1  7.2  6.9 
1966  15.0  9.2  4.7  12.3  7.6  6.9 
1967  15.3  9.9  4.9  12.8  8.8  7.4 
1968  15.7  10.8  4.9  12.8  9.5  7.7 
1969  16.8  11.3  4.9  12.5  10.0  8.0 
1970  16.8  11.9  5.1  13.1  11.4  8.5 
1971  17.2  12.2  5.0  13.1  12.2  8.8 
1972  17.3  12.4  4.8  13.9  12.1  8.4 
1973  17.2  12.8  4.5  13.4  12.0  8.2 
1974  19.0  13.3  4.3  14.5  12.2  7.9 
1975  18.0  13.2  4.4  16.1  13.7  8.3 
1976  17.4  13.2  4.5  15.1  14.1  8.5 
1977  16.2  14.4  4.6  15.4  14.7  8.8 
1978  15.2  14.7  4.7  15.4  14.7  8.6 
1979  15.2  14.7  4.5  14.7  14.7  8.4 
1980  15.8  14.8  4.6  15.4  15.5  8.4 
1981  17.5  14.6  4.7  16.0  15.6  8.0 
1982  17.1  15.2  4.8  17.8  17.3  8.6 
1983  16.3  15.6  4.6  17.8  17.7  8.5 
1984  16.3  15.7  4.6  18.2  17.1  8.3 
1985  16.5  15.3  4.5  18.6  17.1  8.1 
1986  17.2  15.2  4.6  18.1  17.5  8.0 
1987  17.3  15.4  4.7  17.4  16.9  7.9 
1988  17.3  15.8  4.7  16.9  16.8  7.7 
1989  17.2  15.9  4.8  17.1  16.9  7.7 
1990  17.7  16.5  5.1  18.2  17.9  8.3 
1991  18.3  16.4  5.3  19.4  19.2  8.9 
1992  18.5  16.2  5.5  19.1  20.0  9.3 
1993  17.6  16.4  5.5  18.7  19.7  9.3 
1994  17.0  16.9  5.2  17.6  18.6  8.9 
1995  17.2  16.8  5.1  17.3  18.1  8.5 
1996  17.6  17.1  5.0  16.4  17.4  8.2 
1997  18.3  16.9  4.9  15.3  16.6  7.8 
1998  18.2  17.0  4.8  15.1  16.8  7.9 
1999  18.0  16.8  4.7  14.2  16.2  7.6 
2000  18.1  16.9  4.3  13.7  15.6  7.0 
2001  17.6  17.4  4.4  13.5  18.0  7.2 
2002  16.4  16.8  4.4  12.9  17.6  7.2 
2003  16.3  16.9  4.3  12.7  17.7  7.1 
2004  16.3  17.0  4.2  12.2  17.2  7.0 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from Statistics Canada, CANSIM, tables 380-0007, 380-0022, 384-0001, 
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TABLE A.2: Intergovernmental Transfers as Shares of Revenues and Expenditures, 1945-2004, 
(%) 
 
  Transfers to provinces 
as a share of provincial 
revenues 
Transfers to provinces 
as a share of provincial 
expenditures 
Transfers to local 
governments as a share 
of local revenues 
Transfers to local 
governments as a share 
of local expenditures 
1945  28.0  34.5  14.6  17.1 
1946  26.4  33.6  16.8  20.1 
1947  23.3  30.5  19.2  20.7 
1948  16.8  20.0  21.5  22.4 
1949  19.3  20.4  23.6  24.2 
1950  22.4  25.2  23.2  24.9 
1951  20.3  22.9  23.6  25.1 
1952  26.6  32.8  22.8  24.1 
1953  28.2  34.9  23.4  25.1 
1954  28.2  33.9  23.2  23.2 
1955  26.7  31.8  26.3  26.9 
1956  25.4  29.8  25.8  26.9 
1957  23.6  29.0  28.2  30.1 
1958  26.3  30.4  30.2  32.9 
1959  29.7  34.5  30.1  33.3 
1960  30.9  33.5  31.1  34.6 
1961  32.0  34.3  30.3  32.8 
1962  28.8  33.5  33.7  37.6 
1963  27.7  31.9  33.8  37.4 
1964  24.9  29.0  35.0  38.1 
1965  24.4  29.3  36.3  38.7 
1966  24.4  28.5  38.6  42.1 
1967  24.7  27.6  38.6  41.0 
1968  24.5  27.7  38.6  39.8 
1969  23.3  26.4  38.4  38.4 
1970  25.2  26.7  41.7  42.1 
1971  28.0  29.8  42.9  42.5 
1972  25.4  26.6  44.0  44.5 
1973  22.9  24.5  44.3  43.3 
1974  23.4  25.8  45.7  44.9 
1975  25.8  25.8  48.1  48.6 
1976  25.1  24.6  45.9  45.3 
1977  24.4  24.4  48.4  49.3 
1978  23.8  24.5  45.6  45.6 
1979  22.7  23.3  46.1  45.5 
1980  22.2  21.4  47.2  49.3 
1981  21.3  20.4  44.9  47.0 
1982  21.9  19.8  47.0  48.7 
1983  21.7  19.9  46.8  47.9 
1984  22.4  21.5  45.5  46.4 
1985  23.0  21.8  45.5  46.3 
1986  21.7  19.8  44.7  46.6 
1987  21.2  20.1  43.6  46.0 
1988  20.7  20.2  43.3  46.1 
1989  19.9  19.4  42.0  45.1 
1990  19.5  18.5  42.8  45.9 
1991  20.1  17.7  43.3  45.3 
1992  21.1  17.7  44.2  46.6 
1993  20.7  17.9  43.3  45.0 
1994  18.8  17.2  43.6  45.6 
1995  19.1  18.0  43.6  46.2 
1996  16.4  16.0  41.8  43.7 
1997  14.2  14.0  40.4  42.8 
1998  14.2  14.0  41.2  42.8 
1999  16.3  16.9  40.6  41.7 
2000  14.8  15.8  40.8  42.3 
2001  15.3  15.0  40.2  41.1 
2002  14.9  14.2  40.4  41.1 
2003  16.8  16.5  40.0  40.4 
2004  15.7  15.8  40.3  40.7 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from Statistics Canada, CANSIM, tables 380-0007, 380-0022, 384-0001, 
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TABLE A.3: Bugdetary Surplus as a Share of GDP by Level of Government, 1945-2004, (%) 
 
  Federal    Provincial Local      Federal    Provincial Local 
1945  -15.2  0.8  0.4    1975  -3.0  -1.0  -0.7 
1946  -2.0  0.8  0.1    1976  -2.4  -0.6  -0.8 
1947  4.9  0.7  -0.1    1977  -4.3  -0.3  -0.5 
1948  4.8  0.1  -0.4    1978  -5.5  0.3  -0.6 
1949  2.8  -0.3  -0.5    1979  -4.0  0.2  -0.6 
1950  3.4  0.0  -0.5    1980  -4.0  -0.9  -0.2 
1951  4.4  0.0  -0.7    1981  -2.8  -0.8  -0.1 
1952  0.8  0.2  -0.8    1982  -5.6  -2.2  -0.2 
1953  0.6  0.4  -0.7    1983  -6.8  -2.0  -0.2 
1954  -0.2  0.2  -1.1    1984  -7.5  -0.9  -0.2 
1955  0.7  0.1  -0.9    1985  -7.8  -1.2  -0.3 
1956  1.8  -0.1  -0.9    1986  -5.6  -2.0  -0.1 
1957  0.7  0.0  -0.8    1987  -4.6  -1.2  0.0 
1958  -2.1  -0.1  -0.7    1988  -4.3  -0.4  0.0 
1959  -0.9  0.0  -0.7    1989  -4.2  -0.7  0.1 
1960  -0.6  -0.5  -0.6    1990  -4.9  -1.2  0.0 
1961  -1.7  -0.5  -0.6    1991  -5.4  -3.0  -0.2 
1962  -2.3  0.3  -0.7    1992  -5.1  -4.0  0.0 
1963  -1.8  0.2  -0.7    1993  -5.4  -3.1  0.0 
1964  -0.3  0.1  -0.5    1994  -4.5  -1.9  0.0 
1965  0.0  0.6  -0.9    1995  -3.9  -1.3  0.0 
1966  -0.7  0.3  -0.8    1996  -2.0  -0.5  0.0 
1967  -1.1  -0.1  -0.8    1997  0.7  -0.4  0.1 
1968  -1.2  0.4  -1.0    1998  0.8  -1.1  0.4 
1969  0.5  0.4  -1.1    1999  0.9  0.3  0.4 
1970  -0.5  -0.3  -0.9    2000  1.9  0.8  0.0 
1971  -0.9  -0.3  -1.0    2001  1.1  -0.8  -0.2 
1972  -1.2  -0.3  -0.8    2002  0.8  -1.3  -0.3 
1973  -0.1  0.5  -0.9    2003  0.1  -0.6  -0.3 
1974  0.0  0.8  -0.9    2004  0.6  -0.3  -0.4 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from Statistics Canada, CANSIM, tables 380-0007, 
384-0001 and 384-0014. Due to a break in the series following the introduction of full 
accrual accounting, data for the federal government starting in 1983-84 are not directly 
comparable with earlier years 86    J. Tremblay / Public Policy Review   









Provincial -  
territorial 
governments 
1961  36.5    1983  41.8  9.5 
1962  35.4    1984  47.3  10.8 
1963  35.5    1985  51.3  13.0 
1964  33.2    1986  55.0  15.2 
1965  30.1    1987  56.0  15.6 
1966  27.7    1988  56.0  15.1 
1967  27.3    1989  57.0  15.2 
1968  25.9    1990  60.5  15.9 
1969  23.2    1991  65.0  19.3 
1970  23.0    1992  69.6  23.0 
1971  22.9    1993  72.6  26.5 
1972  22.1    1994  73.6  27.2 
1973  20.6    1995  73.9  27.7 
1974  18.6    1996  72.8  27.7 
1975  20.2    1997  68.9  28.4 
1976  21.0    1998  66.3  27.7 
1977  24.2    1999  60.6  28.8 
1978  27.1    2000  53.5  25.4 
1979  28.0    2001  51.5  25.1 
1980  29.7    2002  48.8  24.5 
1981  29.9    2003  45.6  23.8 
1982  36.0    2004  42.9  22.2 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from Statistics Canada, CANSIM, tables 380-0007, 
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TABLE A.5: Net Provincial Debt as a Share of GDP by Province, 1983-2004, (%) 
 
 NFLD  PEI NS NB  QUE  ONT  MAN  SASK  ALB BC 
1983  40.4  9.2  22.0  21.2  18.8 13.0 14.9 -2.2 -12.4  1.2 
1984  42.6  9.3  24.0  22.3  21.4 13.1 15.0 0.4  -11.6  3.2 
1985  45.5  10.3 26.1  22.9  24.0 15.3 16.9 3.7  -9.5  4.8 
1986  43.5  10.0 26.1  24.7  24.5 15.1 19.6 11.1 -2.0  6.6 
1987  42.4  10.3 26.0  25.2  24.2 14.7 21.7 13.8 2.5  6.0 
1988  37.7  10.0 25.8  24.1  23.3 13.8 19.7 15.3 5.6  5.1 
1989  37.5  9.7  27.3  23.0  23.3 12.7 19.0 16.6 8.8  4.7 
1990  38.5  10.1 27.8  24.0  24.5 13.6 19.7 17.4 7.8  8.0 
1991  40.9  11.9 30.7  26.4  27.0 17.4 21.7 28.0 10.9  10.8 
1992  44.7  15.0 40.3  37.7  29.6 21.6 26.1 31.0 15.8  12.1 
1993  66.0  31.2 44.3  39.5  32.0 27.5 27.7 33.9 16.5  12.2 
1994  66.6  39.3 45.6  38.5  33.8 29.2 26.6 31.2 14.4  11.9 
1995  66.9  37.0 45.2  35.7  34.8 30.9 25.4 28.8 12.6  11.5 
1996  69.6  35.1 46.8  34.8  35.9 32.2 22.8 24.9 8.8  11.3 
1997  69.3  35.6 45.6  34.4  43.8 31.4 21.6 24.6 5.6  10.9 
1998  70.2  33.2 48.1  34.0  42.1 30.4 21.0 24.2 4.5  10.8 
1999  66.4  32.4 48.7  36.4  39.1 32.9 21.2 23.0 1.8  18.5 
2000  60.6  30.8 46.1  33.8  36.5 30.1 20.3 20.7 -3.0  16.5 
2001  62.8  30.6 46.8  31.9  36.6 29.1 21.0 21.1 -3.3  17.9 
2002  63.9  31.4 44.9  31.7  35.2 27.7 19.9 20.4 -4.5  19.6 
2003  62.8  34.0 42.7  30.4  34.0 28.0 21.7 19.3 -6.2  19.6 
2004  60.7  33.4 41.2  28.9  32.3 27.5 19.7 17.0 -8.1  17.2 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from Statistics Canada, CANSIM, tables 380-0007, 
384-0001 and 384-0014. Due to a break in the series following accounting changes, data 
after the following years are not directly comparable with earlier years: Newfoundland 
(1993-94), Québec (1997-98), Ontario (1999-2000) and BC (2000-01). 88    J. Tremblay / Public Policy Review   





















1989  23.94  48.42  48.93  47.36  74.40  70.27  9.64  8.81 
1990  26.28  48.37  48.06  48.60  73.75  71.31  11.17  8.43 
1991  26.64  47.57  45.91  49.07  71.54  65.53  13.77  9.04 
1992  24.37  46.88  47.33  48.26  71.74  69.24  14.07  7.22 
1993  21.26  47.24  48.16  47.05  73.17  70.02  14.46  7.48 
1994  20.37  47.63  51.37  48.02  75.63  72.79  14.11  8.95 
1995  18.02  48.64  49.27  47.36  74.89  73.74  13.48  9.95 
1996  17.95  48.26  47.67  46.46  75.12  72.58  11.57  9.06 
1997  17.51  47.64  50.07  48.13  76.97  73.07  11.76  10.24 
1998  30.03  47.64  51.40  47.34  78.48  74.89  14.18  11.10 
1999  32.30  48.28  45.45  42.01  80.85  74.33  13.48  10.34 
2000  38.49  48.09  48.45  45.04  80.16  73.62  14.48  9.64 
2001  39.27  48.55  51.53  45.85  83.64  72.29  13.06  9.78 
2002  49.74  48.74  52.09  45.72  83.12  72.98  12.97  9.36 
2003  52.85  48.61  52.36  45.99  83.35  73.28  13.38  8.69 
2004  51.19  49.26  53.96  46.01  84.83  72.44  13.25  8.77 

























1989  29.65  53.87  55.92  56.19  81.11  82.30  20.98  21.66 
1990  33.47  52.96  56.39  57.63  80.22  81.89  23.08  22.26 
1991  33.69  51.23  50.49  59.86  77.70  65.45  26.68  18.66 
1992  26.98  49.68  52.12  58.02  75.92  75.40  27.05  17.04 
1993  19.19  50.23  52.41  57.10  76.44  75.69  27.33  16.90 
1994  15.89  49.77  59.19  59.87  81.29  78.53  26.46  20.66 
1995  13.29  51.35  53.82  60.80  82.96  78.75  25.21  22.00 
1996  11.60  50.70  50.87  57.48  80.90  76.32  23.26  17.71 
1997  10.27  52.25  53.75  61.76  82.89  79.07  24.82  20.39 
1998  31.92  53.33  57.30  57.13  86.48  80.28  29.84  26.49 
1999  35.95  53.31  51.83  52.83  87.30  83.24  28.90  24.21 
2000  45.49  51.64  65.20  51.43  85.40  84.98  31.43  22.38 
2001  45.50  52.99  62.33  53.82  89.75  84.70  28.28  23.29 
2002  62.41  53.90  65.11  54.12  89.40  86.02  29.20  25.42 
2003  74.51  54.50  62.87  53.56  90.80  82.29  29.47  20.77 
2004  69.72  56.06  62.20  53.27  90.55  81.63  29.35  18.89 
Source:  Author’s calculations using data from Statistics Canada, CANSIM, tables 385-0002 and 
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